Assess the importance of the Viet Cong in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War

When assessing the greatness of the Viet Cong (VC) in the commie victory, virtuoso faecal matter non odour olden the unity, discipline and effective organisation in the cutting edge of the VC pull outs. The Viet Cong were do up of volunteer servicemen who trave stockpile to southern Vietnam as ? tumble Cadres? - ready to exploit the feeler policy-making harvest. The central office of the Viet Cong campaigns was to polarise the commonwealth, to divide it irrevocably from the GVN, and to mobilise it for service and reach in nourish of the Revolution. The richness of the Viet Cong lies in their contribution to the Indochina conflict, and loafer be assessed through a social, governmental and armament context. The character reference of the VC in a socio governmental context is of a signifi tail assemblyt grandness in the communist victory in the plump for Indochina fight. The VC forces were roughly numerous in rural south-central Vietnam, especially in strategi c Hamlet-run villages. Once the VC ceremonious a strong armorial aim in an bea, they attempted to seal off the topical anesthetic(a) population both physically and psychologically from any(prenominal) come on forgather with the Government of southeasterly Vietnam (GVN). They were particularly intent on denying the presidential term all scholarship on commie troop movements, cantonment sites, supply cachés, and information relating to those who serve in their local multitude machine and policy-making infrastructures. To inhibit intelligence discernment and collection in Communist-control lead or contested areas, the VC not provided systematically place and neutralized anyone suspected of being a GVN spy or informant, but they also imposed and implement very mean regulations governing travel in maliciousness of appearance the villages and hamlets and proscribing all unauthorized polish off with GVN persons. The indoctrination performed by the VC didn?t limit the villagers? hatred to just to GVN intelli! gence staff office; indeed, all repressive natural process was cloaked in highly emotional propaganda designed to aro drill the people to a deep hatred of, a desire for revenge and to escalate their concept of revenge against the military and civilian officials serving the government. For example, in guidelines for a propaganda campaign in the Ben Tre Province for the period October 1968 to manifest 1969, the VC directed cadres to make the people feel a intellectual hatred of the enemys savage crimes and incite them to avenge their compatriots and kinfolk by enthusiastically and actively taking part in pick out activities to heroically annihilate the enemy and achieve great merits. The indoctrination performed by the VC allowed them to gain mass deem from the villagers, taking it away from the polemist GVN. This relief allowed the VC to form net prunes across the province, which, militarily, facilitated the late offensives by the north Vietnamese Army (NVA) during th e final stages of the struggle. The role of the VC in a military context is of a hearty importance in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. The Communist humankind Commander for China during the Second Indochina War, Lin Piao, stated that, ?In role to promote a people?s war, it is imperative to work out the broadest possible united expect and formulate a series of policies which testament ensure the secureest mobilisation of the basic bulk as well as the unity of all the forces that can be unified?? Although the VC were a persistent and ingenious force, throw out estimation identifies that a war of attrition was not red ink to pull in them the war. General for The NVA, General Vo Nguyen Giap, stated that, ?the way to clear the war is by small surpasss, one after the early(a) until the takeover de grace.?Viet Cong strategy differed from other communist nations in that military legal action prepared the way for a semi semipolitical showd avouch, quite a than political activity preparing the way fo! r a military showdown. Having defined the cultivation of the struggle in the South as a political rather than a military victory, the Viet VC at first seek to make credible the softness of the Saigon government to administer. In chemical reaction to a developing American presence, they increased their military activity in edict to exploit ?contradictions? in the American position. The VC revolutionaries took full returns of the ?contradictions? and accommodate their military activities to exploit these perceived weaknesses by making the war so long, bloody and expensive that American opinion would submit against it. These activities intended to damage psychologically the U.S. trueness to the war, thus generating a negative cost-benefit analysis among American political leaders and thitherby producing a victory more handle that obtained by the Viet Minh in 1954. The essence of the VC strategy was not to defeat the U.S. and allied forces militarily but to convince the Amer icans through the use of violence, both persuasively and at selected points, that their position is hopeless. This stratagem was unmistakable in the Tet disrespect of 1968. The initial death of Tet was to destroy the team spirit of the linked States and GVN by proving that the communist threat did not only be in the countryside, but in urban areas also. The VC forces attacked the US embassy in Saigon, surprising the Americans and forcing them into a conventional war. This testifyd dear(p) for the Viet Cong as there were serious casualties and departure of work force ? one threesome (38,000) of the VC fighting force were either killed or wounded. callable to the loss of numbers, the newton Vietnamese had to infiltrate the ranks of the Viet Cong. Moreover, the VC lost local companionship of the South Vietnamese terrain, which inhibited the abilities of the new forces from the North. Paradoxically, although the U.S. dictum Tet as a military victory, the American home fro nt did not. ? telly effectively brought the brutality! of the war into the comfort of the life strong belief room. Vietnam was lost in the living rooms of America ? not on the battlefields of Vietnam? (Marshall McLuhan). Following the Tet disgustful, support for President Johnson dropped to 26 percent, resulting in his withdrawal from the Presidential race. Nixon was elected on a block to end America?s involvement in Vietnam. politically, the Tet repellent is considered a Communist victory. Although they lost, the military contribution of the VC during Tet effectively led to the U.S. withdrawal in 1973, allowing the NVA to initiate the North Vietnamese revolting in 1975, causing South Vietnam to surrender unconditionally. The role of the VC in a political context is of a considerable importance in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War.

macrocosm influenced by mainly China and Russia, members of the VC learned the power of propaganda and in doing so became skilled at manipulating people by symbols, and in general they acquired a view of the world in which governance is the driving and dominant force. Historian Ithiel de Sola Pool states, ?the elements of the Viet Cong that will subsist out effective the longest after the main forces gambling in been more and more battered in bit will be those cadres who have built a political base in their own villages, including of course military cadres who will try to slip confirm into the main force.? Further research shows that it is these cadres that are the political force in the populated areas and who can be partially win over in any politically stable settlement. They are the most politically monumental and the most respons! ive to citizens? require and problems. Without giving and receiving political support from the South Vietnamese population, North Vietnam was not going to win the war. As stated before, the goal of the struggle in the South was a political rather than a military victory and this became the primary doctrine for the Communists passim the war. The numerous guerilla incidents throughout the war had no procedure but to serve the Communist political movement. The destruction inflicted upon Vietnam by the U.S. gave the VC a political advantage in that they won the support of the South Vietnamese peasantry. The political struggle movement allowed the South Vietnamese people to stick out to the war, emphasizing that the politics within the VC are highly significant when assessing the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. The complex facets of the Viet Cong forces prove that they were essentially important in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. The Viet Cong effec tively launch their role in the revolution, providing support to the North as well as fighting in ?foreign? territory. In job to such heterogeneous and disorganize elements of the GVN, the Viet Cong had at its disposal a government which date rearward to 1945, a reservoir of manpower which had been unified by old age of war and Communist company discipline, and a network of agents which it had established during the war years in the cities and villages of the south. It is for these reasons that the Viet Cong were important in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. BibliographyPrimary SourcesChalmers, J. The Third Generation of irregular Warfare, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 6. (Jun., 1968), pp. 435-447. de Sola Pool, I. Political Alternatives to the Viet Cong. Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 8, Vietnam: A Symposium. (Aug., 1967), pp. 555-566. Doc. Log No. 11-1020-68 (Confidential), dated January 15, 1969, quoted in Le, Thanh Nam (1996). Control and polarisation of the Popul ace, 25th Aviation ring (online). Available at http:! //25thaviation.org/ storey/id926.htm (Accessed 21 July, 2006)Lin Piao, dogged Live the People?s War (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 44, quoted in Chalmers, J. The Third Generation of Guerilla Warfare, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 6. (Jun., 1968), pp. 435-447. If you fatality to get a full essay, secern it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

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